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Abstract
Medicare Advantage enrollment has seen tremendous growth over the past decade. However, we know comparatively little
about the experience of beneficiaries in the program. Our knowledge of Medicare Advantage provider networks is particularly
limited. This article is one of the first major assessments of the issue. It seeks to answer 3 important questions. First, are Medicare
Advantage plan networks made up of higher quality providers? Second, how significant are the network restrictions imposed by
Medicare Advantage plans with regard to access to higher quality providers? And finally, how much provider choice are Medicare
Advantage beneficiaries left with? To assess these questions, I utilize geospatial data and individual provider quality measures for
cardiologists, endocrinologists, and obstetricians and gynecologists from California. I find that Medicare Advantage beneficiaries
generally do well in large metropolitan areas compared to traditional Medicare. However, there are concerns for those in
micropolitan and rural areas, and even those in standard metropolitan areas, at times. Crucially, the connection between provider
quality and networks can only be fully understood when connected to assessments of provider access. These findings also raise
questions about how we think about provider networks and the adequacy of current approaches to network regulation.
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Introduction
Medicare Advantage has seen tremendous growth over the
past decade.1 With about one-third of Medicare beneficiaries
enrolled in the program and future growth on the horizon,
assessments of beneficiary experiences are crucially impor-
tant. Potential for growth appears unabated and California has
been spearheading these developments. With more than 40%
of beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare Advantage, California
has one of the highest enrollment rates in the nation.1 More-
over, the state has a long history with managed care, and it has
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a large fraction of its general population enrolled in managed
care products.2
By definition, managed care products restrict consumer
choice by selectively contracting with a certain subset of pro-
viders. Of course, this holds for Medicare Advantage as well,
and federal regulators and consumer groups alike have shared
concerns about the adequacy of provider networks in Medicare
Advantage plans. As a result, over the past decade or so, the
issue of provider networks has been taken on by the federal
government. Indeed, today Medicare Advantage has some of
the most extensive, and restrictive, standards of all insurance
products,3 particularly when compared to the often inconsistent
regulation of plans sold on the Affordable Care Act’s market-
places.4-7 Medicare Advantage plans are also one of the few
products that have been subjected to quantitative standards, as
compared to qualitative standards, for several years. For exam-
ple, plans are required to provide, depending on geographic and
demographic specifications as developed by the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, access to a number of spe-
cialties within certain driving and distance restrictions.8
Yet, even Medicare Advantage regulations have a number
of loopholes and ambiguities. Perhaps one of the most glaring
omissions is the complete lack of provider quality as a factor in
adequacy standards. More generally, our overall knowledge of
Medicare Advantage provider networks is rather limited.9 This
study serves as the first major assessments of the issue. It seeks
to answer 3 important questions. First, do Medicare Advantage
plans emphasize access to higher quality providers by selec-
tively contracting with providers of above higher quality? Sec-
ond, how significant are the network restrictions imposed by
Medicare Advantage plans with regard to access to higher
quality providers? And finally, how much provider choice are
Medicare Advantage beneficiaries left with? To answer these
questions, I utilize geospatial data and individual provider
quality measures as developed by the California Healthcare
Performance Information (CHPI) system for cardiologists,
endocrinologists, and obstetricians and gynecologists (OB/
GYNs) from California (note 1).
I find that Medicare Advantage beneficiaries generally do
well in large metropolitan areas compared to traditional
Medicare. However, there are concerns for those in micro-
politan and rural areas, and even those in standard metro-
politan areas, at times. Crucially, the connection between
provider quality and networks can only be fully understood
when connected to assessments of provider access. These
findings also raise questions about how we think about pro-
vider networks and the adequacy of current approaches to
network regulations generally.
Study Data
Although Medicare Advantage enjoys general popularity in
California, plans are not available in every county. Indeed,
beneficiaries in 13 of the state’s 58 counties do not have the
option to join any Medicare Advantage plan. For the remaining
45 counties, the number of plans ranges from 1 to 34, and
averages 6 (median 3, standard deviation 8). Overall, benefici-
aries in the state are provided with 283 plans offered by 22
different carriers. No carrier controls a large share of the mar-
ket. Kaiser Permanente is the state’s most prolific option with
46 plans, followed by HealthNet with 36. Overall, 263 plan
choices are local health maintenance organizations (HMOs)
and preferred provider organization (PPO), the subject of this
study (note 2).
Data on provider quality have significantly improved
outcomes across many medical specialties.10 Yet even today,
accessing quality data for many providers remains challenging
for researchers and consumers alike. In California, the CHPI
system (note 3), a 501(c)(4) nonprofit, public benefit corpora-
tion, offers access to at least some quality measures, all of
which are process-based.11 Based on claims data from 12 mil-
lion Californians in private health plans, including United-
Healthcare, Anthem Blue Cross, and Blue Shield of
California, CHPI provides quality measures for a number of
specialties. The quality measures have been selected by the
Physician Advisory Group, a group of 12 physician experts
from relevant specialties, because they measure how well a
doctor score on following recommended protocols. All quality
measure are relevant to consumers, rigorously developed,
endorsed by the National Quality Forum, and appropriate for
the types of data used.12 The specific measures utilized for the
purpose of this study are endorsed by the National Committee
for Quality Assurance.12 Data for cardiologists, endocrinolo-
gists, and OB/GYNs were obtained from the CHPI website. For
each of these specialties, star ratings (1-4) and percentile rank-
ings are available (note 4).
The CHPI system provides quality data for 1135 OB/GYNs.
The only quality measure available deals with breast cancer
screenings. Specifically, it accounts for appropriate screenings
for breast cancer in women aged 50 to 69. Just over 50% of
providers received 4 stars, while 33% received 3, 13% received
2, and 2% received 1.
Cardiologist quality is assessed via 2 measures (note 5).
First, Monitoring for Patients on Persistent Medications for
Diuretics rates 1004 physicians. Of these, just under one-
quarter of providers scored 4 stars, and just under one-third
scored 3 stars and 2 stars, respectively. The remaining 15%
scored 1 star. The average score is 2.60 with a median of 3.
The second measure is also focused on medication monitoring.
It focuses on prescriptions for angiotensin-converting enzyme
(ACE) inhibitors or angiotensin II receptor blockers. For the
1170 cardiologists with data, the average score is 2.60 (median
of 3). The percentage distribution of star ratings is similar as for
the first measure.
Compared to cardiologists and OB/GYNs, there are rel-
atively few endocrinologists in the state. Two performance
measures are available: Testing Blood Sugar for People with
Diabetes and Testing Kidney Function for Diabetes
Patients. The former is available for 260 physicians (the
mean score is 2.41 with a median of 3), while the latter is
available for 276 physicians (the mean scores is 2.41 with a
median of 3). Just under one-third of endocrinologists
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scored 4 stars and 3 stars, respectively, while one-quarter
scored 2 stars on the blood sugar measure. Only 11% scored
4 stars on the kidney function measure, 40% of providers
scored 3 stars and 30% scored 2 stars.
Medicare Advantage plan data were obtained from the
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and
supplemented with data from the website medicarehelp.org.
Physician data and Medicare Advantage plan data were
matched using provider network data provided by Vericred.
Vericred, under contract with the Robert Wood Johnson Foun-
dation, obtains these data from insurers or machine readable
provider directories. Although not perfect, it is the most com-
plete provider network data available and is commonly used by
researchers to assess provider networks.13,14
Study Methods
Do Medicare Advantage plans emphasize access to higher
quality providers by contracting with providers of above higher
quality? Second, how significant are the network restrictions
imposed by Medicare Advantage plans with regard to access to
higher quality providers? And finally, how much provider
choice are Medicare Advantage beneficiaries left with when
it comes to higher quality providers? To answer these ques-
tions, I first analyze the composition of provider networks in
Medicare Advantage. That is, I compare the mean and median
quality ratings of in-network providers against the overall sup-
ply of providers in a given area. Importantly, beneficiaries of
traditional Medicare would have access to this larger network
under their fee-for-service plan (note 6). I further assess what
percentage of each provider network is composed of providers
of higher quality (ie, 3 groupings developed based on the qual-
ity metrics described below). I then compare the composition
of these networks to the unrestricted “network” available to
beneficiaries in traditional Medicare, that is, the alternative
available to all Medicare beneficiaries. While, by definition,
Medicare Advantage networks are more restrictive than those
available in traditional Medicare because insurers contract
selectively, some have argued that insurers may indeed
improve consumer choice by focusing their networks on higher
quality providers.7 The analysis here evaluates that claim.
Even so, restrictions imposed by insurers may be excessive,
particularly in localized areas. I hence next evaluate the restric-
tiveness of Medicare Advantage networks, again as compared
to traditional Medicare. Specifically, I analyze whether bene-
ficiaries have access to at least 1 provider from each of the 3
quality groupings further described below (50th percentile,
90th percentile, 4-star rating). Finally, I assess the choices
offered to beneficiaries, that is, the number of providers from
each of the 3 quality groupings at certain distance levels. I also
assess the average network breadth. Here, I expand on common
approaches6 by measuring network breadth at various distance
levels. This crucial adaptation provides more meaningful infor-
mation to regulator and consumers alike because the distance
between beneficiary and provider arguably plays a determining
role for patient access.5 Indeed, generally consumers are likely
to prefer providers closer to their home. However, they may be
willing to accept traveling certain distances in order to access
providers of higher quality. Throughout the article, I use dis-
tances of 15, 30, 60, 120, and 240 miles for all assessments.
Again, in all cases, I compare the Medicare Advantage plans to
traditional Medicare.
In order to assess whether Medicare Advantage benefici-
aries have access of higher quality than those of traditional
Medicare, I first determine the mean and median provider qual-
ity rating both in terms of star rating and percentile ranking
based on the CHPI data. Next, I calculate 3 distinct indicators.
First, utilizing the quality measures available for each speci-
alty, I, respectively, determine whether a specific provider is at
or above the 50th percentile, at or above the 90th percentile, or
whether the provider received a perfect 4-star rating. Notably,
the 50th percentile is the least restrictive indicator of the 3,
while the 90th percentile indicator is the most restrictive mea-
sure, with the 4-star rating indicator falling in between the 2.
This approach creates 6 indicators for cardiologists and endo-
crinologists each (2 quality measures, 3 indicators) and 3 mea-
sures for OB/GYNs (1 quality measure, 3 indicators).
In order to compare access between Medicare Advantage
and traditional Medicare, I create a series of dyads for each
specialty expanding on the approach taken by Haeder et al.5
First, I establish which Medicare Advantage plans are available
for each census block group in the state. Census block groups
are the smallest geographical units for which the US Census
Bureau publishes data. Using census block groups, each typi-
cally made up of 600 to 3000 people, allows a much more
fine-grained analysis than relying on the commonly used
county-level approach, which blurs the differences between
Alpine County, with its 1100 residents, and Los Angeles
County, with its more than 10 million residents. Similar popu-
lation numbers across census block groups also make compar-
isons much more reasonable.
I then identified the provider network for the respective speci-
alty by linking theCHPI quality data described above to provider,
network, and plan data made available by Vericred (note 7).
For each plan’s network, I then determine the geographic
distance between the centroid of each census block group a plan
is sold in, and each specialist (note 8). Next, for each census
block group–Medicare Advantage plan combination, I deter-
mine mean and median quality ratings as well as the number
of providers in each quality indicator grouping (50th percentile,
90th percentile, or 4 stars) that fall within 15, 30, 60, 120, and
240 miles of each census block group centroid for a specific
Medicare Advantage plan (note 9). This makes up the first part
of the dyad, respectively. This also allows me to assess whether
there is at least 1 provider for each of the 3 quality groupings
available at the various distance levels. For the second part, I
repeat the steps for an unrestricted “network,” that is, a network
of all providers for the specialty in the state that would be avail-
able to beneficiaries in the traditional Medicare program.
The dyads thus developed allow for comparisons between
Medicare Advantage plans and traditional Medicare, at the
census block group level, with regard to mean and median
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quality ratings (Tables 1–3), the percentage of networks made
up of providers of higher quality (Tables 4–6), access to at least
on provider of higher quality (Tables 7–9), and the number of
providers of higher quality available (Tables 10–12), at the
various distance levels. Utilizing this approach allows me to
hold constant census block group characteristics and thus rely
on test of proportion or t tests for the comparisons. It also
resembles the standard regulatory approach, which only
focuses on distance standards. Importantly, it also provides
meaningful information to assess consumer access for consu-
mers and regulators alike.
Two important factors may significantly affect beneficiary
access. Local demographics may significantly shape local
health-care environments. Specifically, the degree of urbanness
or ruralness of an area has important implications. Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services accounts for this possibility in
its time and distance regulations by developing a typology for
counties with designations including large metropolitan, met-
ropolitan, micropolitan, rural, or counties with extreme access
(CEAC), based on population and population density. I utilize
the CMS typology to provide separate estimates for each cate-
gory but combine micropolitan, rural, and CEAC areas because
of the limited number of cases. Second, networks may differ
based on whether they are developed for PPOs or HMOs.
Importantly, PPO consumers may choose to go outside their
network, albeit at higher out-of-pocket contributions. I hence
provide separate analyses for each insurance type. Overall, this
provides 5 different analyses (PPO and HMO for each
Table 1. Mean and Median Rating for Cardiologists.a
Large Metropolitan Metropolitan Micropolitan and Rural
Miles 15 30 60 120 240 15 30 60 120 240 15 30 60 120 240
HMO
Star rating
MA Mean ACE score 2.75 2.74 2.74 2.72 2.69 2.57 2.57 2.58 2.64 2.63 2.79 1.55 2.12 2.23 2.37
TM 2.85 2.85 2.82 2.77 2.71 2.63 2.64 2.69 2.75 2.71 2.79 2.09 2.57 2.45 2.53
MA Mean DIU score 2.72 2.67 2.63 2.62 2.59 2.56 2.61 2.62 2.57 2.55 3.68 2.25 2.19 2.31 2.38
TM 2.83 2.82 2.78 2.75 2.67 2.62 2.63 2.69 2.73 2.67 3.57 2.36 2.51 2.40 2.47
MA Median ACE
score
2.90 2.89 2.88 2.86 2.86 2.60 2.61 2.64 2.73 2.73 2.79 1.10 1.98 2.14 2.25
TM 2.95 2.96 2.92 2.90 2.90 2.84 2.91 2.88 2.83 2.87 2.82 1.73 2.69 2.01 2.43
MA Median DIU
score
2.75 2.80 2.83 2.87 2.83 2.50 2.54 2.70 2.75 2.73 3.68 2.03 2.00 2.14 2.25
TM 2.90 2.94 2.92 2.90 2.90 2.53 2.68 2.89 2.83 2.87 3.57 2.07 2.40 2.03 2.43
Percentile
MA Mean ACE score 56.35 55.92 55.76 55.23 54.65 52.21 52.29 52.23 53.40 53.18 58.58 25.95 43.72 45.05 48.32
TM 58.55 58.50 57.53 56.49 54.97 53.50 53.58 54.63 56.01 55.07 57.48 35.03 50.40 47.99 50.16
MA Mean DIU score 55.59 54.24 53.38 53.07 52.33 51.53 52.64 52.73 51.57 51.16 80.63 39.85 39.78 41.88 44.87
TM 58.53 58.32 57.41 56.40 54.38 53.31 53.49 54.93 55.95 54.56 77.20 43.91 49.90 47.42 49.11
MA Median ACE
score
57.77 57.29 56.44 55.43 54.83 52.12 51.83 52.11 53.52 53.24 58.58 16.73 42.73 45.58 49.30
TM 60.73 60.35 58.79 58.58 56.21 53.80 53.58 55.15 57.67 56.64 58.62 27.73 50.70 46.68 50.11
MA Median DIU
score
54.92 53.73 52.93 52.66 51.92 50.62 51.09 51.72 50.96 50.46 80.63 34.67 41.93 43.32 45.16
TM 59.93 59.95 58.43 57.53 54.56 52.03 51.52 54.48 56.73 54.88 77.58 43.17 50.46 46.27 48.01
PPO
Star rating
MA Mean ACE score 2.98 2.98 2.96 2.89 2.84 2.59 2.57 2.65 2.82 2.87
TM 2.90 2.89 2.86 2.81 2.74 2.63 2.65 2.70 2.81 2.77
MA Mean DIU score 2.93 2.90 2.85 2.87 2.80 2.51 2.69 2.85 2.83 2.85
TM 2.87 2.87 2.83 2.78 2.70 2.65 2.69 2.75 2.80 2.74
MA Median ACE
score
3.05 2.99 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.57 2.61 2.78 2.99 3.00
TM 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.89 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
MA Median DIU
score
2.99 2.97 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.57 2.67 2.96 2.99 3.00
TM 2.97 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.57 2.79 2.99 3.00 3.00
Percentile
MA Mean ACE score 61.34 61.32 60.94 59.55 58.62 51.78 52.32 53.62 57.54 59.13
TM 59.66 59.51 58.57 57.36 55.76 53.65 54.02 55.29 57.59 56.57
MA Mean DIU score 61.11 60.45 59.12 59.03 57.54 48.44 53.01 57.88 58.08 58.44
TM 59.60 59.39 58.46 57.31 55.22 54.14 54.94 56.55 57.70 56.23
MA Median ACE
score
62.10 67.26 66.37 64.72 62.57 51.96 54.72 57.58 61.94 63.74
TM 62.04 61.56 60.10 59.76 57.26 54.08 54.13 55.84 59.82 58.74
MA Median DIU
score
60.46 58.58 57.75 57.97 57.06 47.92 48.90 56.41 57.14 57.65
TM 61.17 61.21 59.68 58.56 55.66 52.30 52.51 55.52 58.70 57.08
Abbreviations: ACE, angiotensin-converting enzyme; DIU, diuretics; MA, Medicare Advantage; TM, traditional Medicare.
aAll differences between TM and MA are significant at P  .001.
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typology, ie, large metropolitan, metropolitan, micropolitan,
rural, and CEAC) because no PPOs plans are sold in micro-
politan or rural areas of California.
Results
Contracting for Quality
As mentioned above, insurers may selectively contract with
certain providers. They may do this along a variety of measures
including quality, the focus of this study, price, or geographic
coverage, to name just a few dimensions. While the various
dimensions are meaningful, quality seems particularly impor-
tant. Do Medicare Advantage plans thus disproportionally
contract for quality? A first approach to answering the question
utilized mean and median network quality scores.
Mean and median network quality. With regard to cardiologists
(Table 1), Medicare Advantage HMO plans consistently fare
worse than traditional Medicare in terms of mean and median
quality ratings for both quality measures (ie, monitoring
patients for diuretics and monitoring patients for ACE inhibi-
tors). The differences are relatively small, but not unsubstan-
tial, in large and standard metropolitan areas. They further
increase somewhat in micropolitan and rural areas. Notably,
quality ratings are consistently lower in these areas as well,
with the exception of very short distances. The findings for
Table 2. Mean and Median Rating for Endocrinologists.a
Large Metropolitan Metropolitan Micropolitan and Rural
Miles 15 30 60 120 240 15 30 60 120 240 15 30 60 120 240
HMO
Star rating
MA Mean kidney score 2.50 2.51 2.51 2.53 2.51 2.82 2.77 2.71 2.58 2.54 2.90 2.71 2.71
TM 2.32 2.32 2.31 2.33 2.31 2.76 2.71 2.59 2.39 2.32 2.80 2.62 2.47
MA Mean blood sugar score 2.77 2.77 2.78 2.79 2.83 3.13 3.03 3.02 2.95 2.96 3.19 3.00 3.00
TM 2.87 2.83 2.79 2.80 2.84 3.19 3.08 3.02 2.87 2.82 3.29 2.82 2.74
MA Median kidney score 2.52 2.61 2.54 2.66 2.66 2.79 2.68 2.75 2.73 2.71 2.83 3.00 3.00
TM 2.40 2.25 2.09 2.08 2.08 2.70 2.68 2.66 2.25 2.09 3.00 3.00 2.97
MA Median blood sugar score 2.80 2.79 2.83 2.85 2.86 3.22 3.07 3.07 3.02 3.06 3.57 3.00 2.99
TM 3.00 2.98 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.39 3.25 3.18 3.00 3.00 3.20 3.00 3.00
Percentile
MA Mean kidney score 47.51 48.34 48.49 48.83 48.50 57.33 55.79 53.79 50.76 49.72 54.32 54.43 54.39
TM 44.95 45.34 44.94 45.48 45.37 56.28 54.82 51.92 46.99 45.52 56.41 52.88 48.90
MA Mean blood sugar score 57.64 57.76 58.30 58.70 59.29 65.30 63.45 63.72 62.10 62.29 62.70 62.29 62.22
TM 59.64 58.63 57.48 57.73 58.38 66.83 64.43 63.04 59.50 58.12 69.60 57.94 55.84
MA Median kidney score 47.68 49.01 49.76 50.69 49.97 58.55 56.95 55.28 51.79 50.38 58.18 62.00 61.86
TM 43.88 44.89 45.25 45.54 44.95 58.22 56.81 54.06 47.57 45.38 63.71 56.86 52.45
MA Median blood sugar score 58.63 58.86 59.51 59.93 60.62 67.18 65.25 65.38 64.54 64.80 69.55 71.00 70.59
TM 62.49 61.80 61.13 61.70 61.88 69.86 68.11 67.16 63.60 61.77 73.80 60.60 58.96
PPO
Star rating
MA Mean kidney score 2.67 2.48 2.45 2.50 2.52 2.63 2.29 2.18 2.47 3.00
TM 2.29 2.28 2.27 2.30 2.29 2.34 2.19 2.01 2.00 2.00
MA Mean blood sugar score 2.78 2.58 2.65 2.73 2.85 3.13 3.16 3.31 2.87 2.79
TM 2.85 2.82 2.79 2.80 2.84 3.30 3.25 3.13 2.89 2.82
MA Median kidney score 2.63 2.29 2.18 2.47 3.00 3.05 3.00 3.07 2.81 2.75
TM 2.34 2.19 2.01 2.00 2.00 2.90 2.79 2.74 2.20 2.00
MA Median blood sugar score 2.79 2.43 2.24 2.96 3.00 3.12 3.17 3.36 3.04 3.00
TM 2.96 2.98 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.47 3.51 3.34 3.00 3.00
Percentile
MA Mean kidney score 53.04 49.58 49.41 50.86 52.22 67.85 65.81 65.83 54.68 51.67
TM 44.05 44.32 44.19 44.76 44.82 59.87 57.89 54.47 46.90 44.81
MA Mean blood sugar score 60.96 54.84 55.73 57.73 59.81 67.68 68.74 73.27 61.90 58.66
TM 59.20 58.44 57.62 57.69 58.38 68.77 67.83 65.63 60.02 58.12
MA Median kidney score 54.45 50.46 48.59 49.41 51.09 67.77 66.28 66.57 55.46 50.46
TM 42.32 43.41 44.14 44.45 44.05 63.29 60.49 57.32 47.25 44.11
MA Median blood sugar score 60.48 52.00 48.48 59.44 61.91 67.48 68.65 74.22 63.22 60.82
TM 61.99 61.70 61.43 61.78 62.01 69.51 71.47 69.83 64.55 62.01
Abbreviations: MA, Medicare Advantage; TM, traditional Medicare.
aAll differences between TM and PM are significant at P  .001 unless marked in bold.
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Table 3. Mean and Median Rating for Obstetricians and Gynecologists.a
Large Metropolitan Metropolitan Micropolitan and Rural
Miles 15 30 60 120 240 15 30 60 120 240 15 30 60 120 240
HMO
Star rating
MA Mean score 3.30 3.34 3.34 3.33 3.32 3.45 3.43 3.37 3.38 3.38 3.00 3.00 3.26 3.40 3.47
TM 3.30 3.30 3.32 3.34 3.33 3.51 3.52 3.42 3.35 3.33 3.08 3.26 3.29 3.36 3.32
MA Median score 3.41 3.41 3.54 3.64 3.65 3.66 3.73 3.74 3.77 3.80 3.00 3.00 3.24 3.28 3.69
TM 3.45 3.27 3.46 3.95 3.98 3.87 3.94 3.86 3.93 3.94 3.13 3.36 3.29 3.79 3.56
Percentile
MA Mean score 71.05 71.99 71.90 71.72 71.52 74.76 73.87 72.76 72.88 72.71 71.00 70.84 71.95 74.51 75.72
TM 71.55 71.38 71.74 72.03 71.83 75.69 76.14 74.18 72.55 71.87 71.86 69.97 70.55 72.71 71.38
MA Median score 73.29 74.69 74.87 75.20 75.14 77.70 77.84 76.55 76.13 76.00 71.00 70.84 72.49 72.71 77.01
TM 74.60 74.15 74.60 75.29 74.98 78.83 80.24 78.09 76.19 75.15 72.47 73.73 73.06 75.02 74.31
PPO
Star rating
MA Mean score 3.25 3.32 3.35 3.36 3.34 3.80 3.68 3.45 3.36 3.35
TM 3.32 3.30 3.31 3.33 3.33 3.56 3.53 3.43 3.36 3.33
MA Median score 3.29 3.24 3.68 4.00 4.00 3.87 3.89 3.99 4.00 4.00
TM 3.49 3.25 3.42 3.94 4.00 3.97 3.99 3.91 4.00 4.00
Percentile
MA Mean score 68.47 71.84 72.82 72.64 72.35 77.34 75.22 74.35 73.22 72.71
TM 71.88 71.43 71.57 71.92 71.83 76.69 76.38 74.62 72.81 71.90
MA Median score 69.42 72.62 75.15 75.86 75.08 78.58 78.05 78.20 76.17 75.71
TM 75.14 74.34 74.47 75.20 75.00 79.96 80.37 78.60 76.71 75.30
Abbreviations: MA, Medicare Advantage; TM, traditional Medicare.
aAll differences between TM and MA are significant at P < .001 unless marked in bold.
Table 4. Percentage of Networks Made Up of Higher Quality Cardiologists.a
Large Metropolitan Metropolitan Micropolitan and Rural
Miles 15 30 60 120 240 15 30 60 120 240 15 30 60 120 240
HMO
50th percentile ACE score MA 60.31 59.79 60.00 58.94 57.75 52.59 52.92 52.87 55.39 55.24 89.47 25.00 25.06 32.44 42.60
TM 64.96 64.92 63.60 61.99 59.20 56.16 55.54 57.95 60.73 59.41 86.94 85.10 51.73 45.29 50.53
DIU score MA 56.35 54.63 53.59 53.40 52.27 47.39 51.53 52.33 51.69 51.13 89.47 47.50 30.60 39.38 46.81
TM 61.43 61.19 59.32 58.03 54.79 51.11 50.58 56.06 57.63 55.31 86.22 81.90 51.42 46.22 48.18
4 stars ACE score MA 27.08 26.52 26.13 25.77 25.03 19.22 20.66 21.30 22.85 22.89 0.00 0.00 7.79 5.43 3.46
TM 30.26 28.96 28.92 27.95 25.97 20.93 24.63 24.84 27.11 26.12 4.08 20.04 21.45 16.64 20.07
DIU score MA 27.21 25.54 23.55 23.26 22.45 19.66 20.39 22.32 21.53 21.17 89.47 25.00 13.04 8.44 5.30
TM 31.43 29.29 29.25 28.49 26.24 21.44 25.62 25.65 27.58 26.25 81.94 16.79 16.72 14.10 18.26
90th percentile ACE score MA 10.09 9.64 8.83 8.68 8.48 5.00 5.30 5.87 6.63 6.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08
TM 9.84 9.70 8.74 8.01 7.46 4.59 5.11 6.28 7.52 7.39 0.00 1.09 2.15 3.04 4.78
DIU score MA 20.51 18.62 16.55 16.01 15.43 10.85 12.09 14.08 14.43 14.07 89.47 25.00 3.77 2.11 1.45
TM 22.17 21.47 19.73 18.53 16.98 12.94 13.30 16.50 18.06 16.89 80.60 11.49 9.11 8.35 10.70
PPO
50th percentile ACE score MA 75.95 76.61 75.66 71.04 68.44 61.83 56.70 59.27 68.03 69.77
TM 67.15 67.15 65.59 63.64 60.68 56.13 56.03 59.14 63.59 62.22
DIU score MA 63.75 62.30 61.13 62.15 60.14 34.97 51.40 60.93 60.37 61.52
TM 62.91 62.86 60.71 59.17 55.86 50.67 51.57 57.62 59.92 57.53
4 stars ACE score MA 32.49 31.70 29.84 28.40 26.93 11.25 15.67 19.32 25.03 27.76
TM 31.51 30.31 30.31 29.10 26.98 21.62 25.35 25.45 29.08 28.05
DIU score MA 33.55 32.00 28.45 29.29 27.83 19.83 23.38 27.11 28.32 28.93
TM 32.72 30.89 30.89 30.03 27.56 24.27 28.54 28.46 30.26 28.80
90th percentile ACE score MA 6.43 6.42 5.78 6.32 6.12 6.73 7.16 7.47 6.15 6.31
TM 10.45 10.30 9.39 8.55 7.97 4.95 5.06 6.35 8.31 8.28
DIU score MA 19.01 19.05 15.93 14.83 13.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TM 23.19 22.65 20.93 19.62 17.99 10.20 11.54 13.44 14.94 14.47
Abbreviations: ACE, angiotensin-converting enzyme; DIU, diuretics; MA, Medicare Advantage; TM, traditional Medicare.
aAll differences between TM and MA are significant at P < .001 unless marked in bold.
6 Health Services Research and Managerial Epidemiology
short distances may be aberrations hailing from overall limited
availability of providers in these areas.
Overall scores for cardiologists in PPO plans in both
large and standard metropolitan areas are slightly higher
than those for HMOs. Moreover, findings comparing Med-
icare Advantage plans to the overall physician supply are
mixed. In large metropolitan areas, Medicare Advantage
networks tend to do slightly better than the overall supply
Table 5. Percentage of Networks Made Up of Higher Quality Endocrinologists.a
Large Metropolitan Metropolitan Micropolitan and Rural
Miles 15 30 60 120 240 15 30 60 120 240 15 30 60 120 240
HMO
50th percentile Kidney
score
MA 50.07 51.11 49.98 51.36 50.23 70.25 64.75 60.29 52.75 50.09 0.00 0.00 60.66 57.14 57.17
TM 44.65 44.27 43.68 45.02 44.74 65.28 63.90 58.18 48.11 45.06 0.00 0.00 66.46 63.37 54.87
Blood sugar
score
MA 50.96 53.30 53.82 54.61 55.83 70.61 67.65 66.11 61.80 62.06 0.00 0.00 60.66 57.14 56.96
TM 62.23 61.79 59.22 59.82 61.38 75.89 75.85 70.46 63.38 60.94 0.00 0.00 86.92 67.10 61.61
4 stars Kidney
score
MA 10.09 10.42 11.54 11.74 11.28 18.39 19.41 17.75 14.40 13.86 0.00 0.00 29.21 14.29 14.13
TM 9.44 10.47 10.45 10.86 10.09 18.39 14.61 14.07 11.03 10.32 0.00 0.00 21.28 10.24 10.18
Blood sugar
score
MA 34.03 32.86 34.55 34.59 36.23 47.43 42.77 43.75 42.09 43.02 0.00 0.00 58.42 42.86 42.61
TM 35.46 31.79 31.78 32.15 33.43 47.30 38.64 37.85 34.00 32.82 0.00 0.00 47.31 26.26 25.10
90th percentile Kidney
score
MA 0.44 0.56 0.60 0.56 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.59 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TM 0.65 0.56 0.67 0.62 0.57 0.01 0.02 0.23 0.47 0.61 0.00 0.00 4.71 1.29 1.74
Blood sugar
score
MA 10.41 11.25 14.27 15.11 15.39 10.91 14.35 20.40 18.93 20.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TM 15.02 13.70 13.36 13.14 13.07 13.64 13.61 15.73 13.54 12.92 0.00 0.00 19.74 8.18 7.87
PPO
50th percentile Kidney
score
MA 54.06 46.37 46.05 49.80 52.39 81.70 75.78 78.67 55.97 51.57
TM 42.15 41.98 41.79 43.23 43.38 73.85 73.90 63.52 47.33 43.24
Blood sugar
score
MA 55.11 45.62 47.68 52.43 56.95 85.05 80.71 81.62 60.03 54.48
TM 61.00 61.01 58.95 59.24 60.82 81.85 82.46 75.41 63.47 60.13
4 stars Kidney
score
MA 29.80 17.28 17.20 19.98 17.46 27.62 28.98 35.54 22.01 18.86
TM 9.33 10.36 10.34 10.73 10.06 22.87 17.23 16.95 11.41 10.37
Blood sugar
score
MA 35.04 21.65 23.66 26.32 33.03 27.85 35.55 51.43 32.68 29.20
TM 34.27 32.48 32.46 32.72 34.01 51.39 44.24 42.62 35.40 33.61
90th percentile Kidney
score
MA 1.62 3.62 5.33 5.02 4.37 0.00 0.00 0.46 2.87 4.71
TM 0.40 0.47 0.60 0.57 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.32 0.55
Blood sugar
score
MA 9.32 11.35 17.29 21.03 19.14 27.85 34.41 47.27 26.17 20.25
TM 14.79 13.82 13.73 13.47 13.42 17.78 17.85 19.19 14.66 13.49
Abbreviations: MA, Medicare Advantage; TM, traditional Medicare.
aAll differences between TM and MA are significant at P < .001 unless marked in bold.
Table 6. Percentage of Networks Made Up of Higher Quality Obstetricians and Gynecologists.a
Large Metropolitan Metropolitan Micropolitan and Rural
Miles 15 30 60 120 240 15 30 60 120 240 15 30 60 120 240
HMO
MA 50th percentile 81.39 82.78 81.97 81.35 81.49 87.36 86.52 84.17 85.03 84.89 100.00 97.54 79.51 91.91 91.91
TM 83.11 83.43 83.67 84.32 84.43 90.70 90.28 87.14 84.94 84.41 98.71 95.93 83.09 86.71 84.53
MA 4 stars 49.17 51.61 52.84 53.66 53.38 62.58 61.33 57.07 55.31 55.52 0.00 2.46 46.95 47.96 54.68
TM 49.05 49.89 49.88 51.33 51.21 64.71 57.27 57.35 52.40 51.12 10.41 45.59 47.63 51.26 49.59
MA 90th percentile 30.30 30.88 30.75 29.94 29.65 26.61 25.93 27.78 28.29 28.03 0.00 2.46 29.69 38.33 34.06
TM 25.19 24.26 24.55 24.30 24.15 26.24 28.57 27.40 25.31 24.11 1.93 20.62 21.51 23.44 22.46
PPO
MA 50th percentile 81.65 85.03 84.81 83.81 84.14 93.85 90.67 84.69 84.09 83.99
TM 83.64 83.65 83.43 84.09 84.34 92.99 89.55 87.35 84.87 84.22
MA 4 stars 43.72 47.03 50.77 53.59 51.79 87.58 79.98 64.15 53.34 52.95
TM 49.82 49.60 49.60 51.23 51.28 66.23 58.82 59.08 53.15 51.34
MA 90th percentile 21.68 27.26 29.02 28.91 28.15 13.63 19.12 30.08 30.11 28.83
TM 26.13 24.79 24.56 24.34 24.28 24.91 28.52 28.22 26.16 24.42
Abbreviations: MA, Medicare Advantage; TM, traditional Medicare.
aAll differences between TM and MA are significant at P < .001 unless marked in bold.
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of providers. In standard metropolitan areas, the opposite
tends to hold. Overall, quality is higher in large than in
standard metropolitan areas.
The findings for endocrinologists (Table 2) are inconsistent
across the 2 quality measures used (kidney testing and blood
sugar testing). Consistently, Medicare Advantage plans do bet-
ter as compared to the overall supply of providers based on the
Kidney Testing measure but often do worse when using the
Blood Sugar Testing measure. Again, in large and standard
metropolitan areas, PPOs fare better than HMOs. Interestingly,
for endocrinologists, network quality is worst in large metro-
politan areas. With a limited number of providers statewide, it
appears that insurers are more selective in standard metropol-
itan areas and micropolitan and rural areas while contracting
more broadly in large metropolitan areas. However, it is worth
noting that micropolitan and rural areas lack endocrinologists
at short distances.
When it comes to OB/GYNs (Table 3), quality is
rather similar between HMOs and PPOs. Moreover, they are
similar across different degree of rurality, albeit lowest in
micropolitan and rural areas. Overall, comparisons between
Medicare Advantage and the overall physician supply are
mixed. However, the findings can be explained by the similar-
ity of scores across the 2 networks.
Percentage of networks made up of providers of higher quality.
A second approach comparing provider quality focused on the
percentage of networks made up of providers of higher quality.
As described above, here this refers to providers scoring in the
50% percentile or above, the 90th percentile or above, or those
who received a 4-star rating.
For cardiologists (Table 4), the overall provider supply
again generally does better than Medicare Advantage HMO
plans. However, substantively, the differences are rather small
in large metropolitan and standard metropolitan areas. For the
most restrictive quality indicator, providers falling in the 90th
percentile or above, the differences are smallest. Overall, large
metropolitan areas do slightly better at all distance levels than
standard metropolitan areas. However, in micropolitan and
rural areas, significant differences emerge. Although access
is similar or even better in Medicare Advantage plans at very
short distances, Medicare Advantage plans do significantly
worse at distances of 30 miles and above. These differences
are persistent across all 3 quality measure groupings.
The findings differ somewhat with regard to PPO plans.
Here, in large metropolitan areas, Medicare Advantage plans
outperform the overall physician supply with regard to the
percentage of providers above the 50th percentile and those
with 4-star ratings. This only holds for the former in standard
Table 7. Results for Tests of Proportion for Access to At Least 1 Higher Quality Cardiologists.a
Large Metropolitan Metropolitan Micropolitan and Rural
Miles 15 30 60 120 240 15 30 60 120 240 15 30 60 120 240
HMO
50th percentile ACE score MA 0.90 0.95 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.72 0.82 0.89 0.95 0.99 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.53 1.00
TM 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.88 1.00 1.00 1.00
DIU score MA 0.90 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.70 0.81 0.87 0.90 0.93 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.53 1.00
TM 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.53 0.87 1.00 1.00 1.00
4 stars ACE score MA 0.87 0.92 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.58 0.74 0.83 0.88 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.31 0.31
TM 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.97 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.13 0.86 1.00 1.00 1.00
DIU score MA 0.86 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.51 0.71 0.80 0.84 0.85 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.31
TM 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.89 0.97 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.37 0.77 0.99 1.00 1.00
90th percentile ACE score MA 0.76 0.87 0.90 0.90 0.92 0.27 0.55 0.69 0.75 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
TM 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.52 0.86 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.04 0.35 0.95 1.00 1.00
DIU score MA 0.80 0.89 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.33 0.62 0.76 0.83 0.84 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.31
TM 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.95 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.37 0.66 0.99 1.00 1.00
PPO
50th percentile ACE score MA 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.92 0.99 0.99 1.00
TM 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00
DIU score MA 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.42 0.87 0.99 0.99 1.00
TM 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00
4 stars ACE score MA 0.96 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.46 0.88 0.99 0.99 1.00
TM 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00
DIU score MA 0.90 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.37 0.67 0.97 0.99 1.00
TM 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00
90th percentile ACE score MA 0.50 0.84 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.36 0.60 0.95 0.99 1.00
TM 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.60 0.95 0.99 0.99 1.00
DIU score MA 0.82 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.36 0.66 0.97 0.99 1.00
TM 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00
Abbreviations: ACE, angiotensin-converting enzyme; DIU, diuretics; MA, Medicare Advantage; TM, traditional Medicare.
aAll differences between TM and MA are significant at P < .001 unless marked in bold.
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metropolitan areas. When it comes to the highest quality provi-
ders, Medicare Advantage beneficiaries consistently fare worse.
The findings for endocrinologists (Table 5) are again incon-
sistent across the 2 quality measures used. Although findings
are mixed, generally, Medicare Advantage plans outperform
traditional Medicare based on the Kidney Testing measure but
often do worse when using the Blood Sugar Testing measure.
However, at times, particularly at distances of 60 miles and
Table 8. Results for Tests of Proportion for Access to At Least One Higher Quality Endocrinologists.a
Large Metropolitan Metropolitan Micropolitan and Rural
Miles 15 30 60 120 240 15 30 60 120 240 15 30 60 120 240
HMO
50th percentile Kidney score MA 0.78 0.90 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.55 0.70 0.78 0.83 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.31 0.31
TM 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.92 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.06 0.60 0.99 1.00 1.00
Blood sugar score MA 0.78 0.93 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.51 0.66 0.81 0.89 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.31 0.31
TM 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.84 0.94 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.09 0.72 0.99 1.00 1.00
4 stars Kidney score MA 0.52 0.70 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.30 0.52 0.68 0.75 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.31 0.31
TM 0.95 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.58 0.79 0.89 0.99 1.00 0.00 0.13 0.58 1.00 1.00
Blood sugar score MA 0.68 0.87 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.14 0.37 0.63 0.74 0.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TM 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.53 0.72 0.87 0.99 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.45 0.90 1.00
90th percentile Kidney score MA 0.02 0.09 0.25 0.28 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.22 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TM 0.10 0.32 0.89 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.67 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.88 1.00
Blood sugar score MA 0.46 0.65 0.78 0.79 0.83 0.43 0.58 0.78 0.88 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.31 0.31
TM 0.94 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.73 0.87 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.06 0.58 0.99 1.00 1.00
PPO
50th percentile Kidney score MA 0.91 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.37 0.74 0.95 0.99 1.00
TM 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.96 0.99 1.00 1.00
Blood sugar score MA 0.90 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.37 0.74 0.95 0.99 1.00
TM 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.96 0.99 1.00 1.00
4 stars Kidney score MA 0.46 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.13 0.50 0.91 0.99 1.00
TM 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.66 0.89 0.97 0.99 1.00
Blood sugar score MA 0.39 0.84 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.13 0.53 0.91 0.99 1.00
TM 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.90 0.98 1.00 1.00
90th percentile Kidney score MA 0.07 0.30 0.89 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.55 1.00
TM 0.07 0.30 0.89 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.55 1.00
Blood sugar score MA 0.11 0.28 0.90 1.00 1.00 0.13 0.52 0.91 0.99 1.00
TM 0.96 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.89 0.97 0.99 1.00
Abbreviations: MA, Medicare Advantage; TM, traditional Medicare.
aAll differences between TM and MA are significant at P < .001 unless marked in bold.
Table 9. Results for Tests of Proportion for Access to At Least 1 Higher Quality Obstetricians and Gynecologists.a
Large Metropolitan Metropolitan Micropolitan and Rural
Miles 15 30 60 120 240 15 30 60 120 240 15 30 60 120 240
HMO
MA 50th percentile 0.86 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.66 0.80 0.91 0.98 1.00 0.30 0.33 0.46 1.00 1.00
TM 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.74 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00
MA 4 stars 0.82 0.95 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.62 0.78 0.89 0.96 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.45 1.00 1.00
TM 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.36 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00
MA 90th percentile 0.77 0.92 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.49 0.62 0.80 0.94 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.45 1.00 1.00
TM 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.89 0.97 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.09 0.79 1.00 1.00 1.00
PPO
MA 50th percentile 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.61 0.97 0.99 1.00 1.00
TM 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00
MA 4 stars 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.61 0.97 0.99 1.00 1.00
TM 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00
MA 90th percentile 0.71 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.17 0.48 0.91 1.00 1.00
TM 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00
Abbreviations: MA, Medicare Advantage; TM, traditional Medicare.
aAll differences between TM and MA are significant at P < .001 unless marked in bold.
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above, Medicare Advantage plans outperform traditional Med-
icare. These discrepancies may hail from an overall limited
number of endocrinologists in the state, which means that the
inclusion or exclusion of even a small number of providers may
significantly alter network composition. Additionally, again
note the complete lack of access at close distances to endocri-
nologists in micropolitan and rural areas. These findings are
consistent for both quality measures. When available, Medi-
care Advantage beneficiaries appear to be subject to networks
with significant restrictions when it comes to the most restric-
tive quality indicators, while they do better when using the
medium-restrictive quality grouping.
Finally for OB/GYNs (Table 6), HMO plans in Medicare
Advantage in large and standard metropolitan areas fare
slightly worse for the least restrictive quality indicators but
generally better in the more restrictive quality indicators. In
micropolitan and rural areas, although results are similar, there
are significantly worse results for Medicare Advantage plans
for distances up to 60 miles for the star ratings measure and the
90th percentile measure. Medicare Advantage beneficiaries in
PPO plans are more mixed but generally similar to HMOs.
Overall, these initial analyses indicate several important
findings. Generally, there appear to be only limited differences
in overall network composition, that is, the percentage of pro-
viders in a network of higher quality, in large and standard
metropolitan areas between Medicare Advantage and tradi-
tional Medicare in both HMOs and PPOs. However, when it
comes to the most restrictive quality grouping, particularly at
distances up to 30 and perhaps 60 miles at times, traditional
Medicare beneficiaries appear to have networks of somewhat
better quality, particularly for cardiologists and endocrinolo-
gists. That is, Medicare Advantage plans do at times not
include the providers of the highest quality. Most importantly,
there are significant concerns for Medicare Advantage benefi-
ciaries in micropolitan and rural areas, where higher quality
providers close to home are consistently excluded from net-
works. A significant degree of restrictions appears to linger
well into farther distance levels, as well. In short, there appears
to be no selective contracting for higher quality in Medicare
Advantage when it comes to the 3 specialties under consider-
ation in California.
Contracting and Minimum Access
One of the detriments of selective contracting may be that
beneficiaries in certain areas may be left without access to a
provider closer to home because the insurers and the provider
could not agree on a contract amenable to both parties.
Although this may contain overall costs for insurers and con-
sumers, it may results in problems for consumers when they
try to access services. The proportion of census block groups
left without access to at least 1 provider of higher quality at
various distance levels thus captures a potential downside of
selective contracting in Medicare Advantage as compared to
traditional Medicare.
For cardiologists (Table 7), the findings are consistent
across both PPOs and HMOs in large metropolitan areas. In
both cases, Medicare Advantage and traditional Medicare
plans generally provide almost universal access, while there
are some limitations at very short distance levels. This holds
Table 12. Results for t Test for the Number of Higher Quality Obstetricians and Gynecologists.a
Large Metropolitan Metropolitan Micropolitan and Rural
Miles 15 30 60 120 240 15 30 60 120 240 15 30 60 120 240
HMO
50th percentile MA 17.68 44.66 71.7 86.38 91.97 4.16 12.69 41.63 85.51 101.72 0.30 0.33 5.21 9.18 13.08
TM 94.46 232.92 376.84 493.67 567.67 18.33 50.61 176.55 417.81 561.95 2.85 16.02 62.8 256.34 574.4
% 18.72 19.17 19.03 17.50 16.20 22.70 25.07 23.58 20.47 18.10 10.53 2.06 8.30 3.58 2.28
4 stars MA 10.15 25.65 42.74 53.14 56.86 2.98 8.86 26.8 52.72 62.48 0.00 0.01 3.20 5.16 7.82
TM 53.78 133.97 224.33 300.63 344.47 12.63 34.61 112.62 257.47 340.19 1.39 8.84 36.08 152.46 336.11
% 18.87 19.15 19.05 17.68 16.51 23.59 25.60 23.80 20.48 18.37 0.00 0.11 8.87 3.38 2.33
90th percentile MA 6.14 15.42 25.44 30.06 31.83 1.23 4.42 14.94 29.2 34.35 0.00 0.01 1.90 3.28 4.77
TM 26.58 66.97 110.66 142.44 162.6 5.08 16.48 55.95 124.4 160.54 0.52 3.97 16.66 70.18 152.41
% 23.10 23.03 22.99 21.10 19.58 24.21 26.82 26.70 23.47 21.40 0.00 0.25 11.40 4.67 3.13
PPO
50th percentile MA 8.11 23.79 52.81 65.95 74.46 1.36 6.70 28.78 60.38 70.8
TM 99.11 246.72 395.29 509.9 581.75 21.18 55.19 178.29 445.58 550.37
% 8.18 9.64 13.36 12.93 12.80 6.42 12.14 16.14 13.55 12.86
4 stars MA 4.48 13.29 31.74 42.17 45.83 1.23 5.02 19.55 38.32 44.61
TM 56.34 141.78 235.06 310.72 353.73 14.77 38.47 115.64 277.38 335.47
% 7.95 9.37 13.50 13.57 12.96 8.33 13.05 16.91 13.81 13.30
90th percentile MA 2.56 8.00 18.16 22.75 24.91 0.34 2.60 11.11 21.52 24.28
TM 27.98 71.35 116.4 147.57 167.5 5.66 17.91 57.73 135.77 159.54
% 9.15 11.21 15.60 15.42 14.87 6.01 14.52 19.24 15.85 15.22
Abbreviations: MA, Medicare Advantage; TM, traditional Medicare.
aAll differences between TM and MA are significant at P < .001.
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particularly for access to providers in the 90th percentile and
above. In standard metropolitan areas, findings are similar
across HMO and PPOs plans up to 60 miles. In both cases,
Medicare Advantage plans leave a significant proportion of
census block groups without access at distances up to 60
miles. However, for HMOs, this persists up to 120 miles.
While some of this is the result of a general lack of providers,
particularly at the 15-mile distance level, a significant pro-
portion of the restriction hails from insurers’ network deci-
sions. In all cases, most access levels deteriorate relatively as
quality groupings become more restrictive.
Again, access is particularly challenging in micropolitan
and rural areas. Lack of providers accounts for much of the
limitations at 15 miles but insurers’ network decisions bear the
brunt at 30 miles and above. Generally, a majority of census
block groups in Medicare Advantage plans are without access.
These restrictions are persistent even at distances up to 120
miles for all quality indicators and up to 240 miles for the 4-
star rating and 90th percentile groupings. The restrictions on
providers of highest quality (4 stars or 90th percentile) are
particularly concerning. The findings are generally similar for
both endocrinologists (Table 8) and OB/GYNs (Table 8). How-
ever, access to the highest quality endocrinologists close to
home is often limited. Moreover, access levels for OB/GYNs
in micropolitan and rural areas in Medicare Advantage plans
catch up to those in traditional Medicare by 120 miles.
These second set of findings raise concerns about the restric-
tiveness of Medicare Advantage plans in both standard metro-
politan areas, and even more so in micropolitan and rural areas.
Restrictions in the former are clearly present up to 30 and 60
miles, respectively, and up to even larger distances for the
latter. As mentioned previously, these limitations are not an
artifact of the distribution of providers in general, as access for
beneficiaries in traditional Medicare, at worst, reaches gener-
ally close to universal levels at 30 miles in standard metropol-
itan areas or 60 distance in micropolitan and rural areas.
Selectively Contracting and Beneficiary Choice
One of the most evident results of selective contracting is,
by definition, the reduction in consumer choice among pro-
viders. The absolute number of providers offers important
insights. Moreover, a subsequent comparison in percentage
terms between Medicare Advantage and traditional Medi-
care provides a good indication about the degree of network
constriction. Notably, here I am only interested in providers
of higher quality.
With regard to cardiologists (Table 10), Medicare Advan-
tage beneficiaries of HMOs in large and standard metropolitan
areas have access to networks that include about 25% to 35% of
the number of providers of traditional Medicare. While the
overall number of providers, particularly at shorter distances,
is much larger in metropolitan areas, the absolute percentage
value is larger in the latter. The findings hold across both
quality measures. For micropolitan and rural areas, access to
providers for Medicare Advantage beneficiaries is decidedly
limited. While some of this is again an artifact of provider
locations, this only accounts for access limitations at short
distances. Not surprisingly, percentage values are rather large
at shorter distances. However, consumer choice is significantly
limited by insurers at 60 miles and even more so at larger
distances. For PPOs, the absolute number of providers in net-
work as well as the percentage value is significantly lower as
compared to HMOs, generally hovering around 10%.
Similarly, with regard to endocrinologists (Table 11),
Medicare Advantage beneficiaries in HMO plans have a
larger number of providers to choose from as compared to
PPO plans in absolute and percentage terms. Again, the abso-
lute number of providers is larger in large metropolitan areas
as compared to standard metropolitan areas. However, the
reverse holds in percentage terms with a difference of about
10% to 15% points. For both PPOs and HMOs, percentages
are lower with regard to the Blood Sugar Testing measure as
compared to the Kidney Testing measure. Again, in micropo-
litan and rural areas, access limitations are the result of pro-
vider locations at shorter distances and insurers at distances of
60 miles and above. Overall, it is noteworthy that there is a
limited number of endocrinologists in the state with 4-star
ratings or in the 90th percentile and above.
For OB/GYNs (Table 12), the results are once again sim-
ilar. Better access in HMOs in absolute and percentage terms,
better access in absolute terms in large metropolitan areas
than in standard metropolitan areas, but vice versa in percent-
age terms. And again, significant access limitations in micro-
politan and rural areas as a result of provider location and
network decisions.
Accounting for the Particularities of the California Market
While utilizing the CMS typology for urbanity allows for con-
trolling of important characteristics, concerns may arise about
the significant market position of Kaiser Permanente and its
unique provider model. As a result, I reestimated all previous
analyses without Kaiser Permanente plans included (omitted).
As Kaiser Permanente plans are only sold as HMOs, this does
not affect the findings presented above for PPOs. Although
overall access numbers improve across the board, due to the
concentrated nature of its operations on campuses, the exclu-
sion of Kaiser Permanente Medicare Advantage plans has no
substantive influence on findings in large and standard metro-
politan regions. However, there are substantive differences for
micropolitan and rural areas. Here, large improvements in
access are apparent for the star ratings measures and the 50th
percentile measures, particularly at distances of 60 miles and
above, while the effect on the 90th percentile measure is rather
moderate in absolute terms. Overall, the findings are thus by-
and-large consistent.
Discussion and Limitations
Medicare Advantage plans have seen remarkable enrollment
growth over the past decade. However, an assessment of the
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implications for beneficiaries, particularly when it comes to
provider access, has been rare. This study addresses this lack
of research by looking at 3 important specialties in the nation’s
largest state whose Medicare Advantage penetration rate also
exceeds the national average. The findings equally provide
comfort and raise alarms for those concerned about network
restrictions in Medicare Advantage.
When focusing solely on provider quality, and using the
approaches presented above, there appears to be little cause for
concern. Depending on the specialty, findings with regard to
quality are mixed. Importantly, substantive differences are gen-
erally small. This holds for mean and median network quality
as well as the percentage of networks made up of higher quality
providers. However, at times concerns are apparent with regard
to the inclusion of the providers of the highest quality, that is,
those in the 90th percentile or above. Insurers may be hesitant
to include these providers as they are likely to demand a pre-
mium to enter into contracts.
However, these quality findings must be understood in con-
nection to access to providers. That is, while quality in Medi-
care Advantage as compared to traditional Medicare may be
comparable, perhaps even better in some cases, this may be an
artifact of the network restrictions imposed by insurers. As a
result, even beneficiaries in standard metropolitan areas often
see themselves constricted in their access to higher quality
providers. Choices in terms of the number of available provi-
ders are often rather limited. At times, a significant proportion
of them may have to travel 30, 60, or even 120 miles to
remedy these access limitations. Some of this is foreshadowed
in the presentation of findings focusing solely on quality
described in the previous paragraph, particularly in micropo-
litan and rural areas.
These restrictions may cause problems for seniors. Yet, the
most persistent and substantively large problems are faced of
Medicare Advantage beneficiaries in micropolitan and rural
areas. Here lack of providers is exacerbated by often very
restrictive networks that often make travel of 120 miles, even
240 miles or more, necessary. Traveling at those distances to
see a doctor may be prohibitive for many seniors. The findings
of restricted access to specialists in Medicare Advantage seem
to be in line with several findings from the Affordable Care Act
when it comes to specialists access.15-17 Particularly, the anal-
ysis here also adds to findings from research on the Affordable
Care Act that shows rural areas as particularly challenged when
it comes to network access.5,18
More generally, the findings here indicate that current
approaches to thinking about provider network breadth, as well
as the way provider networks are regulated, may be inadequate.
For one, current approaches fail to take into account provider
quality in general.7 This appears to discourage insurance car-
riers from seeking out provider of the highest quality. Exces-
sive price demands by providers, particularly when in a
monopolistic position, may play an important role here, too,
particularly outside large metropolitan areas, where significant
number of providers are competing with each other. Yet, pro-
vider access is the crucial step that connects insurance coverage
with treatment, and assessments of provider quality can only be
meaningful in connection with assessments of provider access.
Arguably, beneficiaries are likely to value provider networks
more that offer access closer to home. Similarly, they may be
relatively indifferent about larger choices hundreds of miles
away from their home. However, they may be willing to travel
certain distances in order to obtain higher quality care. Again,
current regulatory approaches, as well as scholarly assessment,
fail to take this important characteristic into consideration. As
findings here indicate, accounting for the distance between
beneficiaries and providers is crucially important as network
breadth is dynamic. Trade-offs are apparent at the individual
level and hard to holistically regulate. However, regulating
these complex systems is challenging and bottom-up approach,
and providing additional transparency and information for con-
sumers may be the first tangible step forward.10 Nonetheless,
creative solution to improve access in rural America is cru-
cially moving forward.
There are limitations to this study. For one, it is limited to
only 1 state, California. Naturally, this raises concerns about
how generalizable the findings are. Differentiating by urbanity
alleviates some concerns, as does the fact that the results hold
with and without Kaiser Permanente included. Nonetheless, the
Medicare Advantage market in California differs from other
states such as New York, with many more plans and carriers
present. The study is also focused only on 3 specialties and
relies only limited measures of quality focusing on process and
not outcomes. However, the specialties are crucial for
seniors,16 and various patterns are consistent across specialties
and measures. Moreover, the underlying drivers of health care
and insurance markets are not unique to California. I may also
not be able to capture all of the state’s providers. However,
given the market share of the insurers providing data for the
quality measures, I am nonetheless confident that the vast
majority of providers are included. Similarly, I focus here on
local and not regional plans. Given detailed enrollment num-
bers at the census tract level, I also cannot directly include the
number of beneficiaries per plan and area. Again, this does not
diminish the overall patterns that have become apparent.
Finally, network data were not available for all plans offered
in California. This is unfortunate, but it is worth reiterating that
underlying market forces are consistent for all carriers. In addi-
tion, no apparent pattern emerges with regard to the missing
plans, and a significant majority of plans and beneficiaries are
included here. Finally, I am restricted to the quality measures
available. However, the measures are vetted and deemed
appropriate for the specialties by prominent national entities.
Overall, there appears to be no evidence for selective con-
tracting for higher quality in Medicare Advantage when it
comes to the 3 specialties under consideration in California.
Nonetheless, beneficiaries in large metropolitan areas seem to
fare similar or only slight worse than their peers in traditional
Medicare in terms of quality and there are no concerns about
provider access. However, in micropolitan and rural areas, and
to a degree even in standard metropolitan areas, significant
concerns become apparent, and network decisions by insurers
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and providers significantly contribute the access limitations.
Notably, PPOs do not necessarily outperform HMOs in terms
of access and quality. Perks in Medicare Advantage may make
up for the need to incur longer driving time for some. Yet,
others may find themselves unable to access vital services due
to transportation issues. With growth in Medicare Advantage
continuing, more scrutiny of the consequences becomes
imperative. For now, consumers are best served by diligently
assessing provider networks on their own before making pur-
chasing decisions.
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Notes
1. All 3 specialties are subject to time and distance regulations by the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).8
2. Unfortunately, the network data provided by Vericred do not
include all Medicare Advantage networks. However, it provides
data for the vast majority of enrollees. In California, plans included
provide coverage to about 1.13 million beneficiaries. Data for 170
000 beneficiaries (22%) are not available. Similarly, data are avail-
able for 230 of the state’s 263 distinct Medicare Advantage plans.
3. For details, see http://www.chpis.org/.
4. For a technical explanation of the ratings approach, see https://
caqualityratings.org/attachments/Cycle2Rating_Methods.pdf.
5. Not all quality measures are available for all physicians. A certain
minimum amount of data is required for CHPI to establish a quality
rating.
6. The terms overall physician supply and traditional Medicare are
henceforth used interchangeably where appropriate.
7. Vericred was funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation to
provide these data to researchers.
8. The distances were established using ARCGIS 10.5. The distances
were chosen because of their prevalence in network regulations.
9. I utilize these distances because they are frequently used by
regulators.
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